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Abstract
This article examines the following case. A set of countries produce goods
from labor, government input and natural resources. Because the conserva-
tion of natural resources in any country yields utility (e.g. through biodi-
versity) in every country, and because there is no benevolent international
government, a resident of the countries is chosen as the regulator to whom
conservation policy is delegated. The countries inﬂuence the regulator by
their political contributions. In this common agency setup, the following
result is proven: as long as the minimum conservation standards are im-
plemented, conservation subsidies are welfare decreasing, involving excessive
conservation. This suggests that there should be no “co-ﬁnancing” for des-
ignated conservation sites in the EU NATURA 2000 project.
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1. Introduction
This article considers the case where the management of the conservation
of environment must be delegated to a potentially self-interested regulator.
The research question is then the following: Are regulatory standards suﬃ-
cient, or should subsidies as well be used in conservation?
This article is motivated by the following experience. In the the European
Union (EU), the European Commission (EC) regulates the conservation of
biodiversity by two directives (cf. Ostermann 1998):
• Birds Directive 79/409/EEC establishes a network of designated sites
called Special Protection Areas (SPAS) for wild birds.
• Habitats Directive 92/43/EEC establishes a network of designated sites
called Special Areas of Conservation (SACS) for the conservation of
natural habitats and of wild fauna and ﬂora.
These two directives contain annexes where habitats and species are listed as
being of Community interest. The NATURA 2000 network consist of both
SPAS and SACS sites. A Member State is obliged to guarantee a “Favorable
Conservation Status” to every NATURA 2000 site. Non-governmental orga-
nizations (NGOs) play a crucial role in the political structure of the EU. For
instance, according to Weber and Christophersen (2002), the forest-owner
associations (CEPF and BNFF) and the environmental NGOs (WWF and
Fern) perform political inﬂuence on implementing the Habitats Directive.
There has been three reasons for why EU policy has traditionally relied
on direct regulation rather than on ﬁnancial measures:
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(i) Until 1987, EU environmental policy lacked a proper legal basis. It had
to rely only on the “implied powers” of Article 235 of the 1957 Rome
Treaty, which stipulated the use of directives (Ledoux et al. 2000).
(ii) With the ratiﬁcation of the 1999 Amsterdam Treaty, the EU could adopt
eco-taxes and other ﬁscal measures only with the unanimous agreement
of all states (Jordan 1998). This caused a threshold for ecological tax
reforms and a continuing institutional inducement to rely on regulation.
(iii) Because the founding Member States vested the EU only with a little
ﬁnancial resources, from the viewpoint of the Commission, regulation
had the beneﬁt of being paid for by private actors in the Member States
rather than the EU itself (Majone 1996).
Would it be useful to extend the authority of the Commission beyond direct
regulation? There has been political pressure towards the co-ﬁnancing of the
regulatory sites through the budget of the Commission.
Swanson (1994), Barbier and Schulz (1997) and Endres and Radke (1999)
consider the optimal area of a habitat when the variety of species yields util-
ity, comparing the beneﬁts of maintaining the habitat with those of using
land in production. Barrett (1994), Swanson (1996), Sarr et al. (2008),
Gatti et al. (2011) examine biodiversity management in a world where some
countries (called the “South”) are highly endowed with biodiversity, while
the others (called the “North”) are the primary location of the research and
development industries relying upon these resources. In that case, the prob-
lem is how developing countries should be compensated for the “incremental
costs”of biodiversity conservation. Because I focus on the case of the Euro-
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pean Union (EU), I rather work with a model where every country is endowed
with biodiversity that enhances welfare for the inhabitants of all countries.
The problem is then how the common policy should be organized, given that
the policy makers are potentially self-interested.
Winands et al. (2013) consider how the heterogeneity of countries with
respect to ecosystems and wealth inﬂuences the stability of international
agreements on biodiversity conservation. They model a coalition formation
game and obtain following results. In the absence of inter-country transfers,
heterogeneity in ecosystems and wealth reduces the size of a stable coalition,
but with optimal transfers, even large coalitions can be stable. In contrast
to Winands et al. (2013), I consider the case where countries lobby the
regulator that manages conservation, but where any individual country can
refuse from conservation at a ﬁxed cost. The problem is then to ﬁnd out the
optimal set of tools for the regulator.
Palokangas (2013) examines biodiversity management by a self-interested
regulator for a coalition of countries that perform R&D. He assumes in par-
ticular that the countries have the same production function, the same labor
supply and the same natural resources. He shows that if the subsidies are
ﬁnanced by a distorting consumption tax, then the introduction of subsidies
harms welfare. In this study, I examine a more relevant case where countries
have diﬀerent production functions, diﬀerent labor supplies and diﬀerent nat-
ural resources. To simplify the analysis, I assume non-distorting taxation and
replace R&D by government input to production. In this setup, I show that
the introduction of subsidies harms welfare, because it distorts the allocation
of labor between the private and government sectors.
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The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 speciﬁes
the structure of the model. Section 3 derives the Pareto optimum for the
economy, as a point of reference. Section 4 considers the behavior of ﬁrms
and local governments. Section 5 establishes the political equilibrium, by
which the welfare considerations of environmental policy are examined in
section 6. The results are summarized in section 7.
2. The economy
There is a large number M of countries i ∈ [0,M ] and a number Ji ∈ N
of residents in each country i. The total mass of the residents is J
.
=
∫M
0
Jidi.
2.1. Production
All countries i ∈ [0,M ] supply the same good, which I choose as the
numeraire in the model. In country i, exogenous labor supply Li is allocated
between production li and public services zi and exogenous natural resources
Ni between production ni and conservation bi:
Li = li + zi, li ≥ 0, zi ≥ 0; Ni = ni + bi, ni ≥ 0, bi ≥ 0. (1)
The representative ﬁrm in country i produces output yi from labor li, natural
resources ni and public services zi according to the thrice diﬀerentiable and
strictly concave function
yi = f
i(li, ni, zi), f
i
l > 0, f
i
n > 0, f
i
z > 0, f
i
ll < 0, f
i
nn < 0, (2)
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where the subscripts l, n or z denote partial derivatives of f i with respect to
li, ni or zi, correspondingly.
2.2. Externality through natural resources
All residents in the countries i ∈ [0,M ] beneﬁt from the conserved re-
sources bi of all countries i ∈ [0,M ] according to the CES index
B(b)
.
=
(
1
M
∫ M
0
βib
1−1/σ
i
)σ/(σ−1)
,
σ ∈ (0, 1) ∪ (1,∞),
∫ 1
0
βidi = 1, (3)
where b
.
= {bi| i ∈ [0,M ]} is the vector of conserved resources in all countries,
βi positive constant for i ∈ [0, 1] and σ the constant elasticity of substitution
between any pair bi and bk of conserved resources (k = i). The utility of
conservation is an increasing and concave function x of the index B:
u(b)
.
= x(B), dx′ > 0, x′′ < 0,
∂u
∂bi
= x′
∂B
∂bi
= βi
x′(B(b))
M
[
B(b)
bi
]1/σ
> 0.
(4)
2.3. Utility
To eliminate aggregation problems and distributional concerns from the
model, I assume that all residents j ∈ [0, J ] have the same utility function
Uj = Ij + u(b) for j ∈ [0, J ], (5)
where Ij is the income (= consumption) of resident j and u(b) the common
utility of conservation [cf. (4)]. If utility Uj were a non-linear function of
income Ij , then the distributional eﬀects would excessively complicate the
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analysis. With the quasi-linear utility function (5) and the deﬁnitions (3)
and (4), it is easy to aggregate utilities as follows.
First, the representative resident of the whole economy derives utility
from aggregate consumption c =
∫ J
0
Ijdj and conserved resources b according
to [cf. (4) and (5)]
U(c, b)
.
=
∫ J
0
Ujdj = c+ Ju(b) with c =
∫ J
0
Ijdj and
∂U
∂bi
= J
∂u
∂bi
= βi
J
M
x′(B(b))
[
B(b)
bi
]1/σ
> 0 for i ∈ [0,M ]. (6)
Because the average number of residents per country, J
M
, is strictly positive,
the marginal utility of conservation bi in country i,
∂U
∂bi
, is strictly positive.
Second, the representative resident of country i ∈ [0,M ] derives utility
from conserved resources b and aggregate revenue in that country,
∫ Ji
0
Ijdj,
according to [cf. (4) and (5)]
∫ Ji
0
Ujdj =
∫ Ji
0
Ijdj + Jiu(b) with
∂
∂bk
∫ Ji
0
Ujdj = Ji
∂u
∂bk
= βk
Ji
M
x′(B(b))
[
B(b)
bk
]1/σ
for k ∈ [0,M ]. (7)
Because there is a large number M of countries, the marginal utility of con-
servation bk in any country k is negligible, limM→∞ ∂∂bk
∫ Jk
0
Ujdj = 0. Thus,
the local government in country i (hereafter called country i) ignores its eﬀect
on the conserved resources b and maximizes total revenue in that country:
∫ Ji
0
Ijdj. (8)
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2.4. The regulator
One resident j ∈ [0, J ] at a time is elected for some period as the regulator
that runs conservation policy with the following country-speciﬁc tools. First,
it sets the minimum amount mi of natural resources (hereafter called the
regulatory standard) that must be devoted to conservation [cf. (1)]:
bi ≥ mi with mi ∈ [0, Ni] for i ∈ [0,M ]. (9)
Second, the regulator can provide “co-ﬁnancing” for protected sites (cf. Art.
8, Directive 92/43/EEC). This is an ad valorem subsidy si to natural re-
sources being used for conservation over and above the regulatory standard,
bi − mi. I assume that direct subsidies to the quantity bi of a habitat are
incentive incompatible, because the values of transactions are, but the trans-
acted quantities of natural resources aren’t directly observable.
Each country i ∈ [0,M ] pays political contributions Ri to the regulator.
Following Grossman and Helpman (1994), I deﬁne the regulator’s utility as
follows. The regulator cares about its individual welfare
∫M
0
Ridi+ u(b) [cf.
(5)], where its income
∫M
0
Ridi consists of total contributions it receives from
the countries, and about aggregate welfare U [cf. (6)]: the higher U , the
more likely the incumbent regulator will be re-elected. As in Grossman and
Helpman (1994), the regulator’s utility W is a linear function of both its
welfare as an resident,
∫M
0
Ridi+ u(b), and aggregate welfare U [cf. (6)],
W = αU +
∫ M
0
Ridi+ u(b) = α[c+ u(b)] +
∫ M
0
Ridi+ u(b), α > 0, (10)
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where α is a constant. If the utility function of the regulator, W , were non-
linear in its arguments
∫M
0
Ridi+ u(b) and U , then the distributional eﬀects
of political contributions Ri would excessively complicate the analysis.
3. Pareto optimum
To derive the Pareto optimum for the countries, let’s assume that there
were no regulator and that the representative household could directly max-
imize its utility (6) by the conserved resources b
.
= {bi| i ∈ [0,M ]} and public
services z
.
= {zi| i ∈ [0,M ]}, subject to the condition that the sum of the
outputs yi of all countries i ∈ [0,M ] [cf. (1) and (2)] is consumed:
c
.
=
∫ M
0
yidi =
∫ M
0
f i(li, ni, zi)di =
∫ M
0
f i(Li − zi, Ni − bi, zi)di. (11)
This leads to the Pareto optimality conditions [cf. (2) and (11)]
f iz = f
i
l for i ∈ [0,M ],
∂U
∂bi
= f in for i ∈ [0,M ]. (12)
Production eﬃciency f iz = f
i
l says that the marginal product must be the
same for both private labor li and government labor zi in every country i ∈
[0,M ]. Conservation eﬃciency ∂U
∂bi
= f in says that, in each country i ∈ [0,M ],
the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and natural resources
must be the same in utility and production.
4. Countries
The political economy of conservation is an extensive form game with
the following stages: (I) The local governments of the countries i ∈ [0,M ]
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inﬂuence the regulator, relating their prospective political contributions to
the latter’s decisions. (II) The regulator sets the regulatory standards and
subsidies, and collects political contributions. (III) The local governments
i ∈ [0,M ] conserve habitats bi, produce public services zi and ﬁnance these
by local lump-sum taxes. (IV ) The ﬁrms produce the good from labor and
natural resources. This game is solved in reverse order: stages (IV ) and
(III) in subsections 4.1 and 4.2, and (II) and (I) in the next section 5.
4.1. Firms
Firms use natural resources ni up to the level at which the rent ri for
these is equal to the marginal product of these, ri = f
i
n(li, ni, zi) [cf. (2)].
The subsidy base in country i, V i, is then equal to the rent ri times conserved
resources over and above the regulatory standard, bi −mi, in that country.
Noting (1) and (2), I deﬁne that base as the following function:
V i(zi, bi, mi)
.
= ri(bi −mi) = (bi −mi)f in(li, ni, zi)
= (bi −mi)f in(Li − zi, Ni − bi, zi), V im .=
∂V i
∂mi
= −f in < 0,
V iz
.
=
∂V i
∂zi
= (bi −mi)(f inz − f iln), V ib .=
∂V i
∂bi
= f in − (bi −mi)f inn > 0.
(13)
4.2. Local governments
To ﬁnance the subsidies si, the regulator is allowed to collect a uniform
tax t from all countries. To keep taxation non-distorting, let t be the tax
on given labor supply Li. Noting (1), (2) and (13), one obtains revenue in
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country i, (8), as follows:
∫ Ji
0
Ijdj = πi(zi, bi, mi, si, t)
.
= yi + siV
i − tLi
= f i(Li − zi, Ni − bi, zi) + siV i(zi, bi, mi)− tLi, (14)
where yi is output, si the subsidy for the subsidy base Vi [cf. (13)] and tLi
taxes. Because there is a large number of countries i ∈ [0,M ], the local
government in country i (hereafter country i) ignores its eﬀect on the tax
t. Thus, country i determines its public services zi and conserved resources
bi to maximize the utility of its residents’ aggregate revenue (14) subject to
the regulatory constraint (9), given the tax t. Given the deﬁnition (13), this
maximization yields the equilibrium conditions (cf. the Appendix)
Πi(mi, si, t)
.
= max
zi, bi≥mi
∫ Ji
0
Ijdj = max
zi, bi≥mi
πi(zi, bi, mi, si, t),
∂Πi
∂si
=
∂πi
∂si
= V i,
∂Πi
∂t
=
∂πi
∂t
= −Li, (15)
siV
i
z (zi, bi, mi)− f il (Li − zi, Ni − bi, zi) + f iz(Li − zi, Ni − bi, zi) = 0, (16)
siV
i
b (zi, bi, mi)− f in(Li − zi, Ni − bi, zi)
{
= 0 for bi > mi,
< 0 for bi = mi,
(17)
∂Πi
∂mi
= si(V
i
m + V
i
b )− f in. (18)
From (2) and (17) it follows that the regulatory constraint (9) is binding
without a subsidy (i.e. with si = 0):
−f in < 0, bi
∣∣
si=0
= mi,
∂bi
∂mi
∣∣∣∣
si=0
= 1. (19)
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Because the production function (2) is thrice diﬀerentiable, the subsidy base
(13) is twice diﬀerentiable and the ﬁrst-order conditions (16) and (17) deﬁne
diﬀentiable response functions for country i (cf. the Appendix):
zi(mi, si), bi(mi, si),
∂bi
∂si
∣∣∣∣
si=0
> 0. (20)
In other words, a small subsidy si to conservation increases resources bi de-
voted to conservation in any country i ∈ [0,M ].
5. The political equilibrium
To enable an equilibrium with lobbying, I assume the following: if country
i ∈ [0,M ] is not involved in conservation management, then it is not subject
to the regulatory constraint (9), it does not pay the tax t to the regulator,
does not obtains the subsidy si, but it pays a constant penalty ξj > 0 to the
other countries. In this outside option, the revenue of country i is [cf. (14)]
πi = max
zi, bi≥0, si=t=0
πi − ξi = max
zi
f i(Li − zi, Ni, zi)− ξi = constant. (21)
Given the deﬁnition (13) of the subsidy base and the response functions
(20) of the countries i ∈ [0,M ], the regulator’s budget constraint is then
t
∫ M
0
Lkdk =
∫ M
0
siVidi =
∫ M
0
siV
i
(
zi(mi, si), bi(mi, si)
)
di, (22)
where t
∫M
0
Lkdk is total tax revenue and
∫M
0
siV
idi total subsidies. The bud-
get constraint (22) deﬁnes the tax t as a function of the regulatory standards
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m
.
= {mi| i ∈ [0,M ]} and the subsidies s .= {si| i ∈ [0,M ]} as follows:
t(m, s),
∂t
∂mi
∣∣∣∣
sk=0∀k∈[0,J ]
= 0,
∂t
∂si
∣∣∣∣
sk=0∀k∈[0,J ]
=
V i∫M
0
Lkdk
. (23)
Aggregate consumption c is equal to total revenues
∫M
0
Πidi. Noting (15)
and (23), this condition can be written in the form
c =
∫ M
0
Πi
(
mi, si, t(m, s)
)
di. (24)
Following Grossman and Helpman (1994) and Dixit et a. (1997), I assume
that each country i can credibly commit itself to its contribution function
Ri(mi, si) with any policy (mi, si). With (23) and (24), the utility of the
regulator (10) then becomes
W (m, s)
.
= α
∫ M
0
Πi
(
mi, si, t(m, s)
)
+
∫ M
0
Ri(mi, si)di+ (1 + α)u
(
b(m, s)
)
,
where b(m, s)
.
= {bi(mi, si)| i ∈ [0,M ]}. (25)
Because there is a large number of countries i ∈ [0,M ], country i ignores
its eﬀect on the tax rate t. It maximizes its net revenue Πi(mi, si, t) [cf.
(15)] minus political contributions Ri, given the tax rate t. The regulator
maximizes its utility (25). According to Dixit et al. (1997), a subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium for this game is a policy (m, s) and a set of contribution
schedules Ri(mi, si), i ∈ [0,M ], such that the following conditions hold:
(a) Contributions Ri are non-negative but no more than the contributor’s
revenue Πi.
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(b) The policy (mi, si) maximizes the net revenue of country i [cf. (15)]:
(mi, si) = argmax
mi,si
[
Πi(mi, si, t)− Ri(mi, si)
]
.
(26)
(c) The policy (m, s) maximizes the utility of the regulator:
(m, s) = argmax
m,s
W (m, s), (27)
(d) Country i provides the regulator at least with the level of utility as in
the case it oﬀers nothing (Ri = 0), and the regulator responds optimally,
given the contribution functions Rj(mj , sj) of the other countries j = i.
Given (15) and (18), the equilibrium conditions (26) are equivalent to
∂Ri
∂mi
=
∂Πi
∂mi
= si(V
i
m + V
i
b )− f in,
∂Ri
∂si
=
∂Πi
∂si
= V i. (28)
Conditions (28) say that in equilibrium the change in the contributions of
country i, Ri, due to a change in any instrument mi or si equals the eﬀect
of that instrument on the revenue of that country, Πi. These contribution
schedules are locally truthful. This concept can be extended to a globally
truthful contribution schedule that represents the preferences of country i at
all policy points as follows (cf. Dixit et al. 1997):
Ri = max[Πi − πi, 0], (29)
where πi is the revenue of country i in case that country does not pay con-
tributions, Ri = 0, but the regulator chooses its best response, given the
13
contribution schedules of the other countries k = i [cf. (21)].
6. Welfare considerations
With (15), (25) and (28), the equilibrium conditions of the regulator,
(27), for the regulatory standards m are equivalent to
0 =
∂W
∂mi
= α
(
∂Πi
∂mi
+
∫ M
0
∂Πk
∂t
∂t
∂mi
dk
)
+ (1 + α)
∂U
∂bi
∂bi
∂mi
+
∂Ri
∂mi
= α
(
∂Πi
∂mi
− ∂t
∂mi
∫ M
0
Lkdk
)
+ (1 + α)
∂U
∂bi
∂bi
∂mi
+
∂Ri
∂mi
= (1 + α)
(
∂Πi
∂mi
+
∂U
∂bi
∂bi
∂mi
)
− α ∂t
∂mi
∫ M
0
Lkdk for i ∈ [0,M ]. (30)
Furthermore, if the subsidies s are used, then the function (25) has the
following partial derivatives [cf. (15) and (28)]:
∂W
∂si
= α
(
∂Πi
∂si
+
∫ M
0
∂Πk
∂t
∂t
∂si
dk
)
+ (1 + α)
∂U
∂bi
∂bi
∂si
+
∂Ri
∂si
= α
(
∂Πi
∂si
− ∂t
∂si
∫ M
0
Lkdk
)
+ (1 + α)
∂U
∂bi
∂bi
∂si
+
∂Ri
∂si
= (1 + α)
(
V i +
∂U
∂bi
∂bi
∂si
)
− α ∂t
∂si
∫ M
0
Lkdk for i ∈ [0,M ]. (31)
Let’s consider the initial position where there are no subsidies, si = 0 for
i ∈ [0,M ]. Then, with (16), (19), (23), (28) and (30), the Pareto optimality
conditions (12) hold true as follows:
(
f iz − f il
)
sk=0∀k∈[0,J ] = 0 and
∂W
∂mi
∣∣∣∣
sk=0∀k∈[0,J ]
= (1 + α)
(
−f in +
∂U
∂bi
)
= 0
for i ∈ [0,M ].
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On the other hand, from (6), (20), (23) and (31) it follows that the regulator
is willing to increase subsidies si above zero:
∂W
∂si
∣∣∣∣
sk=0∀k∈[0,J ]
= (1 + α)
(
V i +
∂U
∂bi
∂bi
∂si
)
− αV i = V i︸︷︷︸
+
+(1 + α︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
)
∂U
∂bi︸︷︷︸
+
∂bi
∂si︸︷︷︸
+
> 0 for i ∈ [0,M ].
Thus, the Pareto optimum is not a stable equilibrium with subsidies. With
(16), the subsidies si > 0 violate production eﬃciency [cf. (12)]
f il = f
i
z + siV
i
z > f
i
z for i ∈ [0,M ], (32)
and because ∂bi
∂si
∣∣
si=0
> 0 [cf. (20)], they increase conserved resources bi above
the Pareto optimal level. These results can be summarized as follows:
Proposition. The abolishment of subsidies leads to Pareto optimum. With
subsidies, production eﬃciency is violated by excessive conservation.
The subsidies distort the allocation of labor between private and public sec-
tors [cf. (32)], violating production eﬃciency f iz = f
i
l [cf. (12)].
7. Conclusions
In this article, I consider an international regulator that runs the conser-
vation of environmental resources for a coalition of countries. Firms make
goods from labor, natural resources and public services. The local govern-
ments produce public services and lobby the regulator, relating their prospec-
tive political contributions to the latter’s decisions. The instruments of con-
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servation consist of regulatory standards, and potentially of the subsidies to
conserved resources over and above those standards. The main ﬁndings are
the following. Lobbying for regulatory standards alone leads to Pareto ef-
ﬁciency. The introduction of subsidies generate excessive conservation and
distort the allocation of labor between the private and government sectors.
The analysis is based on four basic assumptions: (i) there are public in-
puts to production in the countries; (ii) the regulator has interests of its own
and it is elected from the residents of the countries, (iii) the individual utility
is linear in consumption, and (iv) revenue-raising taxation is non-distorting.
These assumptions can be justiﬁed as follows. (i) If there were no public
services, then all labor would be employed in private production and the
subsidies would not distort the allocation of labor between the private and
public sectors. (ii) As a resident, the regulator shares the same preferences
with the other residents. Thus, the fully benevolent regulator would not in-
troduce conservation subsidies alongside regulatory standards. (iii) With a
non-linear utility function, the payment of political contributions would in-
volve distributional eﬀects, which would excessively complicate the analysis.
(iv) According to Palokangas (2013), distorting taxation for the payment of
subsidies involves ineﬃciency, which strengthens the result of this article.
While a great deal of caution should be exercised when a highly stylized
game-theoretical model is used to derive results on conservation policy, the
following conclusion is nevertheless justiﬁed. In the EU project NATURA
2000, the power to set regulatory standards is appropriate. If there is any
reason to believe that the policy makers in the EU have interests of their
own, “co-ﬁnancing” alonside regulatory standards hampers welfare.
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Appendix
Country i maximizes maximizes
πi(zi, bi, mi, si, t)
.
= f i(Li − zi︸ ︷︷ ︸
li
, Ni − bi︸ ︷︷ ︸
ni
, zi) + siV
i(zi, bi, mi)− tLi (33)
by (zi, bi) subject to bi ≥ mi. The Lagrangean for this maximization is
Λ
.
= πi + λ(bi −mi), (34)
where the multiplier λ satisﬁes the Kuhn-Tucker conditions
λ ≥ 0, λ(bi −mi) = 0. (35)
Noting (33) and (34), one obtains the ﬁrst-order conditions
∂Λ
∂zi
=
∂πi
∂zi
= siV
i
z (zi, bi, mi)− f il (Li − zi, Ni − bi, zi) + f iz(Li − zi, Ni − bi, zi)
= 0, (36)
∂Λ
∂bi
=
∂πi
∂bi
+ λ = siV
i
b (zi, bi, mi)− f in(Li − zi, Ni − bi, zi) + λ = 0. (37)
Condition (36) is equivalent to (16). Noting (33), (34), (35) and (37), one
can deﬁne (15), (17) and (18):
Πi(mi, si, ti +Rt)
.
= max
zi,bi≥0
πi = max
zi,bi
Λ,
∂Πi
∂si
=
∂Λ
∂si
=
∂πi
∂si
= V i,
∂πi
∂bi
= siV
i
b (zi, bi, mi)− f in(Li − zi, Ni − bi, zi) = −λ
{
= 0 for bi > mi,
< 0 for bi = mi,
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∂Πi
∂mi
=
∂Λ
∂mi
=
∂πi
∂mi
− λ = siV im − λ
= si
[
V im(zi, bi, mi) + V
i
b (zi, bi, mi)
]− f in(Li − zi, Ni − bi, zi).
Finally, let’s consider the case bi > mi. Then, λ = 0 holds by (35) and
the second-order conditions are
∂2πi
∂z2i
< 0, Q
.
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∂2πi
∂b2i
∂2πi
∂bi∂zi
∂2πi
∂bi∂zi
∂2πi
∂z2i
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ > 0. (38)
Furthermore, from (13), (36) and (37) it follows that
∂2πi
∂bi∂zi
∣∣∣∣
si=0
= f iln − f inz,
∂2πi
∂z2i
∣∣∣∣
si=0
= f ill − 2f ilz + f izz,
∂2πi
∂b2i
∣∣∣∣
si=0
= f inn,
∂2πi
∂bi∂si
= V ib = f
i
n − (bi −mi)f inn,
∂2πi
∂zi∂si
= V iz = (bi −mi)(f inz − f iln) = (mi − bi)
∂2πi
∂bi∂zi
∣∣∣∣
si=0 .
Given these results, (2) and (38), one obtains
∂bi
∂si
∣∣∣∣
si=0
= − 1
Q
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∂2πi
∂bi∂si
∂2πi
∂bi∂zi
∂2πi
∂zi∂si
∂2πi
∂z2i
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ = −
1
Q
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∂2πi
∂bi∂si
∂2πi
∂bi∂zi
(mi − bi) ∂2πi∂bi∂zi ∂
2πi
∂z2i
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= − 1
Q
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∂2πi
∂bi∂si
+ (bi −mi)∂2πi∂b2i + (mi − bi)
∂2πi
∂b2i
∂2πi
∂bi∂zi
(mi − bi) ∂2πi∂bi∂zi ∂
2πi
∂z2i
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
bi −mi
Q
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∂2πi
∂b2i
∂2πi
∂bi∂zi
∂2πi
∂bi∂zi
∂2πi
∂z2i
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣︸ ︷︷ ︸
Q
− 1
Q
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∂2πi
∂bi∂si
+ (bi −mi)∂2πi∂b2i
∂2πi
∂bi∂zi
0 ∂
2πi
∂z2i
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
18
= bi −mi − 1
Q
∂2πi
∂z2i
[
∂2πi
∂bi∂si
+ (bi −mi)∂
2πi
∂b2i
]
= bi −mi − 1
Q
∂2πi
∂z2i
[
f in − (bi −mi)f inn + (bi −mi)f inn
]
= bi −mi︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
− 1
Q︸︷︷︸
+
∂2πi
∂z2i︸︷︷︸
−
f in︸︷︷︸
+
> 0.
Acknowledgements
The author thanks IIASA (Laxenburg, Austria) for hospitality in Summer
2014 when the ﬁrst version of this paper was for the most part written.
References
Barbier, E.B., Schulz, C.-E. 1997. Wildlife, biodiversity and trade. Environ-
ment and Development Economics 2, 145–172.
Barrett, Sc. 1994. The biodiversity supergame. Environmental and Resource
Economics 4, 111–122.
Dixit, A., Grossman, G.M., Helpman, E. 1997. Common agency and co-
ordination: general theory and application to management policy making.
Journal of Political Economy 105, 752–769.
Endres, A., Radke, V., 1999. Land use, biodiversity, and sustainability.
Journal of Economics 70, 1–16.
Gatti, R., Goeschl, T., Groom, B., Swanson, T. 2011. The biodiversity
bargaining problem. Environmental and Resource Economics 48, 609–628.
19
Grossman, G., Helpman, E., 1994. Protection for sale. American Economic
Review 84, 833–850.
Jordan, A.J., 1998. Step change or stasis? EC environmental policy after
the Amsterdam summit. Environmental Politics 7, 227–236.
Majone, G., 1996. Regulating europe. Routledge, London.
Ledoux, L., Crooks, S., Jordan, A., Turner, K., 2000. Implementing EU
biodiversity policy: UK experiences. Land Use Policy 17, 257–268.
Ostermann, O., 1998. The need for management of nature conservation sites
designated under NATURA 2000. Journal of Applied Ecology 35, 968–973.
Palokangas, T., 2013. International biodiversity management with technolog-
ical change, in: Crespo Cuaresma, J., Palokangas, T., Tarasyev, A., (Eds.),
Green Growth and Sustainable Development. Springer, Heidelberg, 69–86.
Sarr, M., Goeschl, T., Swanson, T. 2008. The value of conserving genetic
resources for R&D: a survey. Ecological Economics 67, 184–193.
Swanson, T.M. 1994. The economics of extinction revisited and revised: a
generalized framework for the analysis of the problems of endangered species
and biodiversity losses. Oxford Economics Papers 46, 800–821.
Swanson, T. 1996. The reliance of northern economies on southern biodiver-
sity: biodiversity as information. Ecological Economics 17, 1–8.
Weber N, Christophersen, T. 2002. The inﬂuence of non-governmental orga-
nizations on the creation of Natura 2000 during the European policy process.
Forest Policy and Economics 4, 1–12.
Winands, S., Holm-Mu¨ller, K., Weikard, H.-P. 2013. The biodiversity conser-
vation game with heterogeneous countries. Ecological Economics 89, 14–23.
20
